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IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY ON FARMERS IN NORTHERN SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF ADAMAWA STATE

ABSTRACT

This study examines the profound impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the Northern Senatorial District of Adamawa State. The insurgency, characterized by violence, displacement, and disruption of livelihoods, has significantly affected agricultural activities, which are the primary source of income and food security for the local population. This research aims to understand the extent of the insurgency's impact on farming communities, the adaptive strategies employed by farmers, and the overall implications for regional food security and economic stability. The study employs a mixed-methods approach, the preliminary findings suggest that, insurgency has led to a significant reduction in agricultural output, loss of livestock, increased food insecurity, and displacement of farming communities. Additionally, the study explores the resilience and coping mechanisms adopted by farmers, including changes in farming practices, reliance on humanitarian aid, and migration to safer areas. The research concludes with policy recommendations aimed at mitigating the adverse effects of the insurgency on agriculture, enhancing farmer resilience, and promoting sustainable agricultural practices in conflict-affected areas. The insights from this study are crucial for informing targeted interventions and policy decisions to support the recovery and development of the agricultural sector in Adamawa State.

Key words: Boko Haram Insurgency, Farmers Agricultural Impact, Livelihood Disruption, Food, Security.

1.1 Background to the Study

The Northern Senatorial District of Adamawa State in Nigeria has long been an agricultural hub, contributing significantly to the state's food production and economic stability. However, the region has been deeply affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, which began in 2009. Boko Haram, a jihadist group seeking to establish Islamic law in Nigeria, has carried out a series of violent attacks, resulting in widespread insecurity, displacement, and economic disruption in the region (Ibrahim, 2016). The insurgency has had a particularly profound impact on the agricultural sector in the Northern Senatorial District, which primarily relies on subsistence farming for livelihoods (Adebayo, 2017). The constant threat of violence, attacks on farmlands, and displacement of farming communities have disrupted agricultural activities, leading to a significant decline in food production and the livelihoods of farmers (Ibrahim & Tukur, 2018).

The growing rate of insecurity in Nigeria is worrisome, huge number of public resources are consumed in tackling insecurity challenges to the detriment of provision of other public goods like infrastructures and social amenities. It has been observed that all the political regions are not saved. There are issues of militants and sea pirates in the South-South, Human trafficking in the South-East, armed rubbering in the South-West, cattle rustlers in the North, and farmers/herdsmen issue in the North-central and Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East. Boko Haram insurgency has become one of the terrorist organizations penetrating West Africa and Central Africa affecting the Socio-economic activities of people. It has operational base in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The group has its root from North-Eastern Nigeria with prominent foundation in Borno State, Yobe State and Adamawa State. This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the region, examining how it has affected their socio-economic conditions, well-being, and psychological health. Furthermore, it investigates the strategies and interventions employed by both local and international actors to mitigate the negative consequences of the insurgency on the farming communities.

The research objectives of this thesis are designed to provide a structured approach to address the multifaceted impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the Northern Senatorial District of Adamawa State. These objectives are to assess the socio-economic impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the Northern Senatorial District of Adamawa State, to investigate the social impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the region, and to explore the psychological impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the Northern Senatorial District.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

Globally, insecurity phenomenon has, indeed, posed the greatest threat to the present world order and has been encapsulated in the nine-letter word: “Boko Haram”. Boko Haram may have existed in diverse ways in the decades; even centuries that had gone by without much threat to international security and global order, but the world of the twenty-first century appear to be witnessing a major scourge borne out of the phenomenon of Boko Haram. As noted by Nkwede (2013), the issue of security has remained topical and indeed constituted a serious cause for concern not only to the private but also to public individuals in Nigeria. The security question has, in recent times, emerged as a key concept in Nigeria’s struggle for good governance, sustainable democracy and development. Apparently, the increasing spread of nefarious activities of Boko Haram sect in Nigeria and the destruction of lives and property is a growing concern that could not be wished away with a wave of hand (Alao. Atere, Alao, 2015 and Ogege, 2013). The effects of Boko Haram insurgency on the socio-economic development in Nigeria and its implications on corporate existence of the country as well as its image internationally constitute the prime motivator of this paper.

2.1.1 Socio-Economic Development

Socio-economic development refers to the process of social and economic development in a society. It is measured with indicators such as GDP, life expectancy, literacy and levels of employment. Changes in

less-tangible factors are also considered, such as personal dignity, freedom of association, personal safety and freedom from fear of physical harm, and the extent of participation in civil society. In a more amenable manner, socio-economic development is a process that seeks to identify both the social and the economic needs within a community and seek to create strategies that would address those needs in ways that are practical and in the best interests of the community over the long run. The general idea is to find ways to improve the standard of living within the areas while also making sure the local economy is healthy and capable of sustaining the population present in the area. Thus, it is usually referred to as the general improvement in living standards. The enterprise and economic development Glossary sees socio-economic development as a process that brings about changes in locations where people live, work, and share things in common while factoring in economic, social and cultural impacts as well as economic, social, cultural and political wants and needs. Locations here are seen as a place of community as well as a geography occupied by a socio-economic group (Spero and Hart, 1999).

2.1.2 History Growth of Boko Haram In Nigeria

The origin of Boko Haram is shrouded in uncertainty. Boko Haram to a large extent is not the first Islamic fundamentalist sect in Nigeria to adopt violence as a weapon of operation (Alao, Atere, and Alao, 2015). This stems from the fact that in the 1970s and 1980s, one Mohammed Marwa that was widely acknowledged as dangerous to peace and stability of the nation formed the sect that was known as Maitatsine. Marwa engineered many riots in the country which led to the deaths of many people and as a corollary of this; some scholars view Boko Haram as an extension of the Maitatsine riots (Johnson, 2011). Far from the above, some scholars trace the origin of the sect to 1995 with Lawan Abubakar as its founder. For them, it was when Abubakar left for further studies in Saudi Arabia that the sect then known as Sahaba that Muhammed Yusuf who is also regarded as the leader, took over the affairs of the sect (Ogege, 2013). To some, Boko Haram is traced to Shehu Sanni, a civil right activist in Northern Nigeria. Apart from the above, numerous expositions on the origin and founder of Boko Haram abound (Davyibo 2009, Bumah and Abimbola 2009, Langmang 2011, Ogodo 2011, Uzodike and Maiangwa 2012). A popular opinion about the origin of the current Boko Haram in Nigeria is that it have been founded in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, North-Eastern Nigeria by Ustaz Mallam Muhammed Yusuf. The group later moved to Kanamma in Yobe State in 2004 where it set up a camp called "Afghanistan." From this camp, it launched attacks on civil society, security agencies and other attributes of western education (Owalade, 2014, Ekanem, Dada, & Ejue, 2012). Obviously, from the aforementioned origins of Boko Haram, one thing that is crystally clear is the fact that the group was founded by the late Mallam Muhammed Yusuf with the official name intact. Unarguably, it was under the leadership of the slain Mallam Muhammed Yusuf that Boko Haram became radicalized and gained national and international recognition and collaboration especially with AI-Qacda in Islamic Maghreb (Abimbola and Adesole, 2012). It should be gainsaid that since 2009, Boko Haram has constituted a serious security challenge in the Northern part of Nigeria and has continued to assume a staggering dimension till date.

2.1.3 Impact of the Boko-Haram Insurgency on Rural Communities and Its Implication on Sustainable Development of Rural Livelihoods

The strategies and activities that produce the capabilities for a household's sustenance and long-term well-being make up rural livelihoods (Onwuaroh et al., 2017). Ikpe (2017) asserts that Boko Haram's actions have significantly disrupted the area's key economic activity. The conflict's detrimental effects on the rural economy and way of life severely weakened the region's demographic well-being. In the northeast, there were as there are less meaningful jobs even before the crisis, and there are even fewer now. Agriculture accounted for the majority of labour force participation (43%) as well as the non-agricultural, primarily unorganised sector (39 percent). Based on the submission of the World Bank (2015), the rate of labour involved in agriculture substantially declined (to about 27%) at the peak of the insurgency (2012-2013).

This showed that the insurgency has considerably reduced agricultural activity and restricted access to land for raising crops and livestock. Since agricultural production has decreased, food prices have increased and households are now more susceptible to shocks and stressors. This has caused a significant increase in unemployment, food insecurity, and poverty in the area. In real terms, the crisis caused the poverty rate to increase from 47.3% in 2011 to roughly 71% in 2019 (Eme & Ibieta, 2012; NBS, 2019; Avis, 2020).

2.1.3.1 Food Security and Nutrition

Improving food security and eradicating hunger through the promotion of sustainable agriculture are key priorities of the sustainable development goals of the United Nations (Banik, 2019). The Boko-Haram conflict has significantly diminished household capacity to carry on with ordinary livelihoods, as well as market function and trade flows, despite the northeast being a region that produces food and serves as a supply route for livestock marketing within and outside the country (Sunday et al., 2017). According to Mwangi et al (2014), the conflict has affected the food supply and nutrition of people across various parts of the region, particularly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. The conflict has caused a reduction in crop output, increased prices of inputs food, and also increased transportation costs. This is partly attributed to the killing of a substantial (about 13,000) number of rural farmers by the insurgents (Mustapha, 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2015). Equally, a large number (over a million) of fishermen from the area had migrated to other neighbouring countries like Chad, Cameroun, and Niger republic. This had a negative impact on fishery activity in the area and the livelihood of the people. Similarly, livestock activities also suffered similar consequences, as it hampered the livestock markets in terms of access to locations, frequency of operations, and attendance of participants (Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics & UNICEF, 2014).

2.1.3.2 Farmers Income

Farmers' income refers to profits obtained from farm operations over a given period. Farmers prepare accounts of their operations to account for profits or losses over a period. A farm income statement provides a summary of the income and expenses incurred over a specified farming period (Edwards,

2009). According to Womach (2005), farmers' income can be measured using various yardsticks such as gross cash income from sale of produce, livestock, and other farm-related goods or gross cash income excluding expenses on feed, seed, fertilizer, property taxes, interest on debt and wages and net cash income. Farmers generate income from various activities such as crop farming and animal husbandry.

Majority of rural people in Borno state are crop farmers, herdsman, and fishermen. The State has three unique agro-ecological zones; Sahel, Sudan and Northern Guinea Savanna. This allows for cultivation of variety of crops such as maize, sorghum, rice, millet, cowpea, soybean, groundnut, sesame, melon, lettuce, carrot, garlic, mango, citrus and gum Arabic (Mikloda & Joshua, 2007). Borno State is the largest gum Arabic producer in Nigeria closely followed by Yobe (RMRDC, 2004). Apart from crop farming, the state is one of the leading livestock producing states in Nigeria. According to BOMOA (1995), Borno State has 1,312,300 hectares of land under grazing and forest reserve. In addition, the state is one of the largest supplier of freshwater fish and exporter of livestock in the country. It also serves as a major inlet for livestock from the countries bordering it; Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic. Livestock and their by-products are used not only for consumption and trade but also as raw materials in meat factories, hides, and skins in leather industries, milk and butter, oils and bone and horns for glue and animal feeds. According to Balami (2001), traders in Borno dealt in slaves, domestic animals and their by-products (hides and skins), processed leather, garments and craft materials for most of the 19th century. In fact, the trans-Saharan trade provided the major link for Borno to the International market.

2.1.3.3 Abandonment of farmland and Farmers Income

Studies have shown that farming contributes significantly to economic growth by ensuring food security, source of employment and income generation as well as poverty alleviation (Mellor, 1999). Mathew and Adegboye (2010) report that farming activities account for 24.4% - 85.1% percent across Nigeria. Across the states, farming activities ranges between 2.4 - 91.7 %, with most states averaging 50%. Farming influences economic development through its contribution to productivity and farmers' income. Yet, this contribution has been hampered as farmers flee for their lives abandoning their farmlands due to the insurgency.

2.1.3.4 Healthcare

Enhanced healthcare service provision is critical to the improvement in the quality of life of citizens and achieving sustainable development (Oyibocha et al., 2014). Because a secure environment is necessary for maintaining quality health services, the relationship between security and healthcare is complicated (Boerma et al., 2019). Even before the emergence of the Boko-Haram conflict, populations in northern Nigeria lacked appropriate access to high- quality healthcare. However, the conflict that has existed in the area for more than ten years due to the BokoHaram insurgency has made matters worse. The fighting has caused workers to be displaced as well as the destruction of the few health centres in the majority of the impacted communities. Even after Nigeria celebrated the eradication of polio, insurgents who were holding towns and villages prevented the region from receiving an equitable distribution of the polio vaccine, leading to the resurgence of new cases (Tyndall et al, 2020). Similar restrictions, such as a lack of knowledge about services and high transportation expenses, prevent the majority of IDPs in host

societies from accessing health services. In terms of the spread of communicable diseases like cholera and polio in the area, this has had very severe health consequences.

2.1.3.5 Education

According to the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals, all students should possess the knowledge and skills necessary to advance sustainable development (O'Flaherty & Liddy, 2018). To understand the discourse on the impact of education in the Northeast region we need to flash back on some critical facts in the sector. Given the 2014 kidnapping of more than 200 female students from the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, the situation became frightening for young girls (Hassan, 2014). Parents were demotivated from sending their kids to school as a result, and those who were already enrolled were pulled out. All of these incidents occurred in a region that was already educationally impoverished before the insurgency, and additional attacks will weaken the area and the educational sector generally in the near future by increasing the proportion of young people who have dropped out of school, are uneducated, are unemployed, and at risk of being attracted to terrorists' activities (Segun et al., 2016; Awortu, 2015). The Boko-Haram insurgency has impacted the quality of manpower planning and the overall performance of tertiary institutions, as a result of the decreased level of productivity of staff. This was also caused by the exit of some competent staff to other safer regions, according to a recent study in the area by Ojeleke et al. (2022).

2.1.4 The Socioeconomic and Political Motivation of Boko Haram

Since the return to civil rule in 1999, religious intolerance has assumed a new dimension in Nigeria. The current wave of Boko Haram sect raises fundamental issues whether Nigeria is a lawless society or the problem of lawlessness has been part of the tradition and style of living of the people before the advent of the two major foreign religions (Islam and Christianity).

Lenshie, Edward and Abel 2012, opined that one of the major problems confronting Nigeria today as a nation is sectarian crises manifesting in various ways. However, solution proffered to the evident devastating effects has not yield positive results, hence successive administrations have had distractions of religious crises characterised by mistrust, suspicion and destruction of lives and properties.

2.1.5 Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

Boko Haram insurgency has confronted Nigeria with massive assaults, which undoubtedly have led to the death of many Nigerians and valuable properties destroyed. The sect has been described as the world deadliest and destructive terrorist, both in terms of brutality, mindless savagery and flagrant disobedience to the principles of peace and stability (Punch Newspaper 2015). The sect unleashes terror, tension and fear in the mind of every Nigerian and the international community does not feel unaffected.

Boko Haram as a group of Islamic fundamentalists is committed to carrying out holy war (jihad) and Islamising northern states of Nigeria and probably conquering the entire country through Jihad. In Borno, the stronghold of the sect, many lives and properties have been lost to the sect attacks. On the 28th January 2011, the governorship candidate of the All-Nigerians People Party (ANPP) Engineer Modu

Fannami Gubio and six other persons including the brother of the then Borno State Governor, AlhajimGoniModu Sheriff were killed by the insurgents (The Nation Newspaper 2011). Its activities started with the clash with Nigerian police in July 2009. According to Okpaga, the investigation by the Nigerian police which was engineered by the report that the group was arming itself to wage holy war (Jihad) against the state led to the deadly clash between the two groups (Okpaga, Chigiote, Innocent 2012). Attacks have focused largely on state security forces, police, soldiers, civil defence, and prison wardens, worship centres, community and religious leaders, politicians and other civilians who they consider as “enemies”. However, the attack on the United Nations Building at Nigeria’s capital city Abuja, on 26 August 2011, which drew global attention, marked a departure from Boko Haram’s traditional target of government facilities and indeed signposts the possibility of a change in target (Akande 2012).

There is evidence that some of the detailed elements of Boko Haram have link with foreign militant groups, including north- Africa based Alqaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM). At the same time, Boko Haram remains firmly focused on domestic Nigerian issues. Whenever its spokesman claims responsibility for attack, he points at national grievances which are not similar to the ideology of Alqaeda. But its anger is directed not at America or Europe but at the Nigerian government. The sect has always claimed that its focus is on targeting officials of the government who have misused state funds hence, there are numerous cases of attacks in different parts of the country, which have wreaked much havoc.

2.1.7 Factors Responsible for Boko Haram Crises

Bad governance in Nigeria has impoverished the masses and hence, creating avenue for easy formation of criminal groups who are searching for means of livelihood. Lack of jobs for teaming Nigerian youths is a strong factor for Boko Haram crises in northern part of the country. Karl Max once predicted that there would be a time when machines would be used to work in place of man and when people are not getting jobs, they would resort to revolution (Onimhawo, Izibili and Igboin 2006). That is what is currently going on in Nigeria today. Idowu makes it clear that because of the failure of the government to provide basic infrastructural needs for its populace; new conflicts have emerged through political opportunists, who have explored condition of the poor to address the non-responses of the state to lawful yearnings of the citizens (Idowu 2008). This propels a number of frustrated groups who think they have been cut off from the society to make their intention known to the government through violent means.

2.1.8 Boko Haram Insurgency in Socio-Economic Perspective

As earlier indicated, this paper is aimed at examining the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency on social and economic activities not only in the affected areas but the country as a whole. Our findings show that beyond religious and political meanings read to Boko Haram, constant attack by insurgents have endangered social and economic activities in Nigeria, which have in turn affected national development. This is our focus in this section. The security challenge posed by Boko Haram has reached a point where indigenes and non-indigenes are leaving the northern region to avert their being killed by the insurgents and business owners close down their shops. However, the economic activities of Borno, Yobe and other northern states where Boko Haram spread their tentacles have been crippled economically (Falola and

Heaton 2008). For instance, local investors who normally are supposed to contribute to the economic development of the area have left since no reasonable investor would want to invest his capital in a violent prone environment. Consequently, most of the investors who moved away from these affected states reinvest their capital in other Nigerian communities free from the insurgence. In this wise, most of the affected investors interviewed such as (Okeke 2016, Nwankwo 2016, Okafor 2016, and Nzediegwu 2016), submitted that the activities of the insurgence made them to relocate their investment to Edo State. According to a report in an Afenmai online magazine, small business firms established by indigenes and nonindigenes between 2010-2014 have increased significantly in Edo state (Afenmai Online Magazine 2014). Outside this, the security challenge has also led to drastic reduction of people's patronage of agricultural produce from the north to southern communities because of the recent rumour that members of the sect are planning to send poisonous products to other parts of the country. Owing to this development, the system of farming has been improved through the use of mechanized farming to meet up with current demand for agricultural produce such as cassava, yam, palm oil, pepper, okra, melon and others. The Ibillo market in Akoko Edo Local Government Area of Edo State which is one of the biggest markets in Afenmai land now serves as a major market where traders from other parts of the country buy agricultural goods. For instance, much of the gari sold at Bodija market in Ibadan is produced from Edo state. One of our informants, Mrs. Nwabueze, a gari trader in Bodija market affirmed this when she said that she travels to Ibillo every three weeks to buy goods such as gari, pepper and red oil. This suggests that the buyers of farm produce in Edo state are from different parts of the country (Nwabueze 2016). The increase in patronage is largely an aftermath insecurity arising from Boko Haram insurgency.

Bank transactions have also been affected and it has become very important for the banks in affected areas to review their operational hours from usual opening 8.00am and close by 4.00pm to unusual time from 9.00am to 12.00 noon. This decision was taken by the financial institutions to safeguard their Business. According to Dauda 2014, this arrangement has made it difficult for customers especially traders to deposit their daily proceeds in the banks due to the limited banking operational hours that are no longer in their favour. This situation has forced business owners to be hiding their money either in the shop or at home. This could best explain the major reason for the rising cases of shop breakings, burglaries and home robbery in northern Nigeria. It should be remarked that the prices of goods have been increased due to shortage of production and supply from north to the south where the goods are largely consumed. The northern farmers find it difficult to carry out their legitimate right of farming and in some cases; goods are stockpiled wasting in the hands of farmers because the traders from the south are scared to travel to the north to buy goods. Example of this is the killing of four traders on the 5th of May and 10 more people on June 28 from Bodija market Ibadan Oyo State in 2013 when they travelled to Borno State to buy wares. Therefore, immediately after the killing, the Ibadan Foodstuff Traders Association placed an indefinite ban on travelling to the north to purchase beans on its members (NAIJ Report 2016).

The phenomenon of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has become a social problem and dangerous to economic Development. The population of IDPs in the north is worrisome because many of them are family men and women who ordinarily are supposed to fend for their family. The fact cannot be denied that IDPs have their basic rights to existence, food, shelter, education, security among other amenities.

However, funds meant for the development of the country are now being channeled towards providing basic needs for the IDPs. Billions of naira has been spent on this project and many of IDPs who are supposed to be working and contribute to the economy are denied their right to work. Private agencies, Local, state and federal government have spent billions of naira to distribute relief materials to the IDPs. On 26 of November 2015, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) distributed 1,120 bags of rice, 2,240 bags of maize, 2,120 bags of millet, 280 bags of cement, roofing sheets, ceilings, mosquito nets, mattresses, tissues, detergent and lastly, over 800million has been spent by Yobe state government on the welfare of the Pompomari Camp, Damaturu (Daily Independence 2015). All these have negative impacts on economic development of the affected states and Nigeria as a whole. The sect blossoming activities have led to the reduction of government derivation from the affected northern states as a result of restiveness in those areas as well as reducing investment and growth of business. The insecurity challenge continues to make it impossible for the government to execute vital project for the people. Dauda 2014, opines that the insurgence of Boko Haram in the north has drastically reduced government of the days performance in the affected area. It should be noted that security challenges in northern Nigeria have cost the economy of the country N1.3 trillion (The Sun Newspaper 2016).

Resources which normally could have been used to improve existing projects and start other ones are being diverted to restructure and replaced what has been destroyed by the insurgence. Since no investor would want to invest his capital in an atmosphere of insecurity, it is therefore, suffice to say that menacing activities of Boko Haram are bane to economic development.

Education is worst hit by the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria. Apart from the fact that the agitation of the sect is that Western education is forbidden and unislamic, formal education has remained the bedrock of human and capital developments in Nigeria. Today, millions of children from the north no longer have access to basic education. The insecurity challenge has led to the death of many teachers, students and school property destroyed thereby making it impossible for pupils to go to school. This situation made Borno state government to close down public and private school for 18 months. Without any doubt, the future of many children from northern extraction has been jeopardised as a result of the inability to go to school. Education is one of the major institutions contributing to the sustainable development of the society and if it is affected, the economic activities of the state will be threatened.

Obviously speaking, the problem of Nigeria is the fear of one ethnic or religious group dominating the other through political means. According to Agbaje 1990, democracy allows conflict in the society to be resolved by rational argument and persuasion rather than by violence coercion. The manipulation of religion by northern politicians to win election is contributing to the political backwardness in the country. In April 19, 2011, a polling booth was bombed in Maiduguri by Boko Haram because of its perceived domination by opposition party (Johnstone 2012). In 2015 general election, the sect issued statement warning residents not to participate in the election and as a result of these; many eligible voters became scared and decided to stay away from the polling booth. It is therefore obvious that activities of the Boko Haram group to disenfranchise people in order to win elections further show the danger it portrays to our hard earn democracy.

Furthermore, Boko Haram insurgency threatens national integration. This is so because reasons adduced for the establishment of National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) in 1973 have been jeopardised. Many parents from southern extraction of the country no longer want their children to be posted to the north for the fear of being killed. However, majority of the southern Corp members who have been posted to the north are redeploying to the south. Outside NYSC, there is also mass movement of non-indigene who are resident in north for many years back to the southern states. Today, the inability of the non-indigene to live and exercise their legitimate right in the north have created fear among northerners living in the south and many of them are also moving out of the south to the north. It is therefore crystal clear that the activities of the sect if not stringently dealt with will destroy the country called Nigeria.

2.1.9 Vulnerability and Coping Mechanisms of Farmers

According to official statistics, 82.4 million people were forcibly displaced at the end of 2020, including 48 million internally displaced persons (UNHCR 2021). Recent reports suggest that the total number of forcibly displaced people worldwide has now risen to above 100 million.¹ In many displacement settings, people flee political violence. In fact, all six ‘Level 3’ (that is, most severe) emergencies as classified by the World Food Programme are the direct result of violent conflict (WFP, 2020).² In addition, women and girls are often at particular risk in these situations, as they are faced with vulnerabilities, persecution and forms of violence that are based on their gender (World Bank, 2017). However, how the three dimensions of forced displacement, gender and violence jointly shape people’s behaviors and outcomes in conflict crises is not well understood and data-driven empirical evidence is particularly scarce (Bruck and Stojetz, 2021). Such evidence is particularly needed for humanitarian emergency settings, where individuals and households rely even more on interventions than in other, more peaceful settings. Specifically, it is necessary to inform an emerging class of new interventions that seek to bridge the gap between those operating at the so-called humanitarian–development–peacebuilding (HDP) triple nexus and those trying to foster durable solutions (DS) for forcibly displaced people (Nguya and Siddiqui, 2020).

2.1.10 Displacement

By the end of 2020, the conflict had displaced about 2.1 million individuals in Northeast Nigeria (UNHCR, 2021). An estimated 56% of the internally displaced population are children (IOM, 2020). The number of IDPs increased rapidly in 2014 and has remained at more or less the same level to the present day. Figure A1b displays reported dates of (first) displacement in our survey data, which is representative for the displaced population in North-east Nigeria in 2018. Most IDPs in North-east Nigeria are displaced within their state of origin, 74% of IDPs are located in Borno state and 83% of all IDPs are from that state. An estimated 57% of IDPs reside in one of the 2,085 documented host communities, while the remaining 43% live in one of the documented 307 camps or camp-like settings. Of the IDPs in host communities, 90% live in private buildings.

2.1.11 Gender inequality and gender-based violence

Gender inequality and gender-based violence are highly prevalent in the region, as the conflict and other factors create and perpetuate gender-based disparities, discrimination, barriers to empowerment, and risks

of intimate partner violence (e.g., Ekhatior-Mobayode et al., 2020). Specifically, the strong social and gender norms have been shown to shape nutrition and welfare outcomes across and within families (UN OCHA, 2018, Nwoke et al., 2022) as well as conflict outcomes, such as recruitment into Boko Haram (Rexer, 2018). Social norms in the region continue to create strong, gender-specific challenges and disadvantages for women in many dimensions (Agbonifo, 2020; CARE, 2022). Women are often primarily expected to fulfill their responsibilities as caregivers and subsistence farmers and face genderbased barriers to access to credit, land properties, employment, education, and medical care, among other things (Allanana, 2013; Onwuka et al., 2015). In addition, it has been shown that several factors, including climate stress and food crises, increase rates of marriages at an early age (Agwu and Okhimamhe, 2009). Women are also often excluded from decision-making processes inside and outside their homes, including farming decisions and participation in local community organizations and politics (Ogunlela and Mukhtar, 2009; Nagarajan, 2017; UN Women 2020). The Women, Peace, and Security Index by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security ranks countries according to 11 indicators in three different categories, namely inclusion, justice and security. Nigeria as a whole is ranked as number 145 of 167 countries (GIWPS, 2019). A pilot study to produce the index at the sub-national level shows that the extent of these issues also varies significantly within Nigeria, with the three states Adamawa, Borno and Yobe scoring worst.

2.1.12 Government and international interventions

Government Interventions in form of early warning and the sampling of some mechanisms of conflict management. In Nigeria, there is some overlap between traditional and religious institutional interventions. Since in some communities' traditional leaders such as emirs are closely linked to their "spiritual" counterparts, government assigns limited roles to these institutions on the bottom rung of the ladder of judicial, political and administrative authority, for example as mediators in disputes. Though conflict management is the jurisdiction of the police, the Nigerian police have been very active in managing conflicts. However, the problem with the police is that the force lacks the capacity to guarantee security due to inadequate logistics, particularly mobility, which would enhance their ability to respond to certain types of conflict particularly one between herders and farmer that usually has history of cooperation. National integration is an elusive coinage for which various scholars have described from different perspectives such as national cohesion, political integration or national integration. While Best, (2006) argued that national integration connotes a community relationship within the same political entity, or a state of mind or disposition to be cohesive, to act together, and to be committed to mutual progress, (Anderson, 1991; Awanyo, 2009) see national integration as an identification of the population with the broader community other than its own group, and the emergence of such bond that does not breach ethnic solidarity. Generally, National integration is a value and a framework that provides environment for mutual cooperation, cross-cultural interactions and articulations that foster interdependency and social harmony needed to drive self-esteem and wellbeing that discourage conflict in society. Whereas conflict has been variously operationalized, the multiplicity of its definition has always pointed at one direction. As an enduring aspect of social existence, it is believed that wherever a community of individual is found, conflict is basically inexcusable. Thus, most conflicts are social in character and usually arise as human

beings pursue their different survival and security needs. In this regard, Stagner (2017) defined conflict as a situation in which two or more human beings desired goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other but not yet by both; each party mobilizing energy to obtain a goal, desire objective or situation and each party perceive the other as a barrier or threat to such goal.

The 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended) recognizes the importance of national integration in a plural society. Chapter 11 paragraph 15 of the 1999 constitution states that the motto of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be “Unity and Faith; Peace and Progress”, while paragraph 15 states that, national integration shall be actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited. Chapter 11, paragraph 15 of the same constitution also states, inter alia, that “for the purpose of promoting national integration, it shall be the duty of the state to provide adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people, goods and services throughout the federation, secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the federation and encourage intermarriage among persons from different places of origin or of different religious, ethnic or linguistic ties. In spite of all these provisions, however, Nigerians still live as strangers. Although, the constitution has these robust promises in letter, yet in practice this is far-fetched. When it comes to elections and political appointments, Nigerians are divided along ethnic lines, religion and indigeneship. This is contrary to the essence of national integration or political integration. Arua, (2009) averred those viable political structures such as political parties, trade unions and pressure groups, when they operate effectively, are instruments of integration at the lower level, which in turn serve as basis for a wider and national integration.

2.1.13 Mechanisms of Conflict Management

Two types exist: conventional and orthodox mechanisms. According to Best (2006) some basic strategies of conflict resolution are as follows: Alternative dispute resolution, is about the search for, and application of, “non-conventional” peaceful methods of settling disputes and resolving conflict situations using the least expensive methods, and in ways that satisfy the parties, as well as ways that preserve relationship after a settlement might have been reached. African traditional dispute resolution, according to him, is a method used to resolve conflict by the use of the authority given to the traditional leaders. Africans use collaborative methods of conflict resolution. Another method is Western alternative dispute resolution, which is a process of conflict resolution without violent means. It is also collaborative in nature. Grassroots community-based activities, good governance, collaborations, negotiation, reconciliation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication and crisis management are all elements of western alternative dispute resolution. However, Adebayo and Olaniyi (2008) showed that, informal traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution are still functional in most parts of Nigeria with communal land tenure system (Igwe, 2019). Considering the persistent preference by both crop farmers and pastoralist for the informal conflict arbitration and mediation, points to common desire for sustaining relationships by both parties. This suggests that taking such disputes to formal authority like police/courts of law for prosecution may worsen the relationship between the disputants. Hence, in all, the best way of dealing with conflict situations according to (Alimba, 2014) is to pre-empt or nip them in the bud.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Developed by psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner, ecological systems theory explains how human development is influenced by different types of environmental systems. Researchers, policy makers, and practitioners are interested in the opportunities and risks associated with how youth spend their discretionary time outside the regular school day. One of the primary settings in which youth spend their out-of-school hours is in organized activities, which include extracurricular activities, after-school programs, and activities at community-based organizations. Much research on out-of-school activities has utilized ecological systems theory to understand how activities foster positive, healthy development of youth from different backgrounds.

Modern theories of human development propose that development occurs over time as part of a complex process involving a system of interactions within the individual and between the individual and the environmental contexts of which he or she is a part. In 1979, Bronfenbrenner's seminal work on ecological systems theory described the child's ecology in terms of a set of nested levels of the environment. In 2006, Bronfenbrenner revised his original theory, adapting the name to bioecological systems theory, emphasizing the active role of the individual in the developmental process. This entry discusses what constitutes the ecological system in Bronfenbrenner's original ecological systems theory, the defining properties of bioecological systems theory, the critiques of ecological systems theory, and the implications of ecological systems theory for research and practice (Bronfenbrenner, U. 2005).

2.2.1 The Ecological System

There are four interrelated types of environmental systems in Bronfenbrenner's classic rendition of ecological systems theory, namely, the (1) micro-, (2) meso-, (3) exo-, and (4) macrosystems. These levels range from smaller, proximal settings in which individuals directly interact to larger, distal settings that indirectly influence development. The various levels within ecological systems theory are often presented graphically as a series of four systems nested around a focal individual like a set of concentric circles (see Figure 1) or a set of Russian dolls (i.e., a matryoshka doll). Considering organized out-of-school activities as part of youth's ecology helps elucidate the particular features of activity settings that can promote positive, healthy development and how relations between activities and other settings contribute to the developmental process. Next, each level of the ecological system is described using associated research on out-of-school activities (Bronfenbrenner, U. 2005).




Figure 1: Theory of Ecological System by Bronfenbrenner Microsystem

The most proximal ecological level is the microsystem, which includes the settings in which individuals directly interact. Organized out-of-school activities represent one microsystem, encompassing different types of activities, such as sports, academic clubs, service projects, and faith-based youth groups. Overall, youth who participate in any activities display more positive social, emotional, psychological, and physical outcomes than their nonparticipating counterparts. Among activity participants, certain types and patterns of activities are associated with more positive outcomes than others. Adolescents report more positive developmental experiences in faith-based activities than in any other type of activity, particularly for identity formation and acquiring prosocial norms. Moreover, participating in a combination of sports and youth development programs (which may or may not be faith based) seems most beneficial, at least compared with participation in only sports or other combinations of solely nonsport activities. Superficially, this might suggest that certain types of activities are the most beneficial. However, research on program quality alludes that quality is likely more important than activity type, though little systematic research has addressed type and quality jointly. Program quality is defined as the set of activity features known to foster positive youth development. There are a variety of measures available to assess program quality, such as the Youth Program Quality Assessment, which can be used in researchers' or practitioners' efforts to improve and promote the quality of activities. In general, these measures assess the degree to which activities are asset-rich environments that provide youth life skill-building opportunities, adult leaders who serve as mentors, and leadership opportunities. Moreover, high-quality activities foster healthy identity development and positive social relationships of youth with peers and leaders. These features are important to build youth's sense of belonging in the activity and to create a safe environment where youth have the confidence to try new things. Scholars studying out-of-school activities as microsystems may ask questions specific to the activity setting, such as "Why do youth participate in certain types of activities versus others?" "Why are certain types of activities linked with certain developmental outcomes. Focus on individual farmers as the central elements. Examine how the insurgency directly affects their daily lives, livelihoods, and well-being. Consider the psychological impact, coping mechanisms, and resilience at the individual level (Bronfenbrenner, U. 2005).

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

3.1 CHI-SQUARE TEST OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHALLENGES FACING FARMERS IN ADAMAWA NORTHERN SENATORIAL DISTRICT AS A RESULT OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCE

The Chi-square test of the significance of challenges facing farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency aims to assess the statistical relationship between various challenges encountered by farmers and the presence of Boko Haram in the region. This statistical analysis seeks to determine whether the observed challenges, such as high transportation costs, poor road networks, insecurity, and limited access to essential agricultural inputs, are significantly associated with the insurgency. By conducting this test, policymakers and stakeholders can gain insights into the most

pressing challenges facing farmers in conflict-affected areas and develop targeted interventions to address these issues and promote agricultural resilience and livelihood sustainability amidst ongoing conflict.

3.1.1 Table: Chi Square Test of the Significance of Challenges facing Farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District as a result of Boko Haram Insurgence

Null Hypothesis: The following Challenges facing Farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District as a result of Boko Haram Insurgence are not significant	Chi-square Statistics	Degree of freedom (DF)	Significance (P-values)
High cost of transportation is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	524.212	4	0.000
Poor road network is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	142.563	4	0.000
Poor storage facilities are challenges facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	198.651	4	0.000
Poor access to market is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	128.625	4	0.000
Banning of Urea Fertilizer is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	86.152	4	0.000
Lack of government agricultural intervention is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	72.524	4	0.000
Poor government policies toward production is a challenge facing maize farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	91.352	4	0.000
Inadequate rainfall during the farming season is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	362.762	4	0.000
Drought is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	129.262	4	0.000
Kidnapping of farmers is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	412.726	4	0.000
Killing of farmers is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	217.625	4	0.000
Destruction of farm by Boko Haram members is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	196.152	4	0.000
Stealing of maize by Boko Haram members is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	215.514	4	0.000
Harassment of maize farmers by security personnel is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	229.627	4	0.000

High cost of fertilizer is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	247.251	4	0.000
Lack of access to tractor for ploughing is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	81.521	4	0.000
High cost of sprayer is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	93.422	4	0.000
High cost of harvester is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	85.125	4	0.000
High cost of Labour is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	69.526	4	0.000
Inadequate capital is a challenge facing maize in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	142.615	4	0.000
High cost of pesticides is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	216.691	4	0.000
Lack of access to improved seed variety is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	94.241	4	0.000
Lack of access to credit facility is a challenge facing farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	76.413	4	0.000

Source: Field Survey, 2024. Note that this table provides a summary of the chi-square test result.

The Chi-square test results indicate the significant impact of various challenges facing farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District due to the Boko Haram insurgency. Each challenge analyzed exhibits a statistically significant association with the insurgency, as indicated by the low p-values (all equal to 0.000).

Firstly, the high cost of transportation emerges as a substantial barrier, with a Chi-square statistic of 524.212. This challenge underscores the economic strain imposed on farmers by increased transportation expenses, likely due to disrupted supply chains and heightened security measures. Similarly, poor road networks, with a Chi-square statistic of 142.563, exacerbate farmers' difficulties in accessing markets and essential services. The insurgency's impact on road infrastructure maintenance and construction further compounds these challenges, isolating rural communities and hindering economic opportunities.

Inadequate storage facilities, evidenced by a Chi-square statistic of 198.651, pose significant risks to farmers, leading to post-harvest losses and reduced market access. The destruction of storage facilities by the insurgency exacerbates these challenges, contributing to food insecurity and economic instability.

Additionally, challenges such as poor access to markets, the banning of urea fertilizer, and lack of government agricultural intervention, all with Chi-square statistics indicating significance, highlight systemic issues that impede agricultural productivity and livelihoods in the region. Furthermore, the

kidnapping and killing of farmers, destruction of farms, stealing of maize, and harassment by security personnel, each with substantial Chi-square statistics, underscore the direct threats to farmers' safety and well-being posed by the insurgency.

Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive strategies that prioritize infrastructure development, access to inputs, market facilitation, and security measures tailored to the needs of farmers in conflict-affected areas. Such interventions are crucial for promoting agricultural resilience, economic stability, and food security in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District amidst the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency.

3.1.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY ON FARMERS

The psychological impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District is profound and pervasive, affecting their mental well-being in numerous ways. Firstly, the constant threat of violence and insecurity instills high levels of psychological distress among farmers, manifesting in anxiety, fear, and apprehension about their safety and that of their families. This heightened state of alertness and vigilance undermines farmers' ability to concentrate on farming tasks, as they remain preoccupied with concerns about potential attacks and the safety of their livelihoods. Moreover, the insurgency has contributed to a range of mental health symptoms among farmers, including depression, sleep disturbances, stress, and feelings of overwhelm. These symptoms reflect the cumulative impact of trauma, loss, and uncertainty experienced by farmers living in conflict-affected areas.

The psychological toll of the insurgency extends beyond individual symptoms to encompass broader existential concerns, such as a loss of hope for the future. Farmers grapple with profound feelings of despair and disillusionment as they confront the protracted nature of the conflict, economic hardship, and the erosion of livelihoods. This loss of hope not only undermines farmers' resilience in the face of adversity but also exacerbates feelings of helplessness and powerlessness. Additionally, the psychological impact of the insurgency reverberates through social networks and community dynamics, affecting interpersonal relationships, trust, and social cohesion among farmers.

3.1.3 Table: Chi Square Test of the Significance of Psychological Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District.

Null Hypothesis: Boko Haram Insurgency does not have significant psychological impact on Farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District.	Chi-square Statistics	Degree of freedom (DF)	Significance (P-values)
Boko Haram insurgency brought about high psychological distress among farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	352.362	4	0.000
Boko Haram insurgency has caused farmers to feel anxious about the safety of themselves and their families in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	173.922	4	0.000
Farmers often experience fear or apprehension while working in the fields due to the threat of Boko Haram attacks in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	625.719	4	0.000

The constant threat of violence from Boko Haram has affected the ability of farmers to concentrate on farming tasks in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District	720.615	4	0.000
Farmer in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District have experienced symptoms of depression as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency.	182.781	4	0.000
Farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District used to have nightmares or trouble sleeping as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency.	82.714	4	0.000
Farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District used to feel stressed or overwhelmed when thinking about the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency.	981.62	4	0.000
Farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District have experienced loss of hope for the future because of the Boko Haram insurgency.	87.162	4	0.000

Source: Field Survey, 2024. Note that this table provides a summary of the chi-square test result.

The Chi-square test results examining the psychological impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District unveil significant and distressing consequences on their mental well-being. Firstly, the insurgency has brought about high levels of psychological distress among farmers, evident from the substantial Chi-square statistic of 352.362. This distress likely stems from the constant threat of violence, uncertainty about the future, and the traumatic experiences endured by farmers and their families. Additionally, farmers experience heightened anxiety regarding their safety and that of their loved ones, as indicated by the significant Chi-square statistic of 173.922. The pervasive fear and apprehension while working in the fields, illustrated by the Chi-square statistic of 625.719, further exacerbate the psychological burden, impeding their ability to carry out farming tasks effectively and efficiently.

Furthermore, the insurgency has resulted in a range of mental health symptoms among farmers, including depression, nightmares, trouble sleeping, stress, and feelings of overwhelm. The Chi-square statistics for these variables (182.781, 82.714, and 981.62, respectively) underscore the profound psychological toll of the conflict. Farmers grapple with symptoms of depression as they navigate the daily challenges and uncertainties wrought by the insurgency, while nightmares and sleep disturbances reflect the pervasive impact of trauma on their mental health. Moreover, the persistent stress and feelings of overwhelm when contemplating the insurgency's consequences signify the chronic distress experienced by farmers, highlighting the urgency of addressing their psychological needs.

Additionally, the insurgency has led to a loss of hope for the future among farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District, as indicated by the significant Chi-square statistic of 87.162. The erosion of hope reflects the pervasive despair and disillusionment stemming from the protracted conflict, economic hardship, and loss of livelihoods. This loss of optimism further compounds the psychological distress experienced by farmers, exacerbating feelings of helplessness and despair. Consequently, addressing the

psychological impact of the insurgency on farmers is paramount for promoting their mental well-being, resilience, and recovery from the trauma endured.

3.1.4 Table: Chi Square Test of the Significance of Measures Taken to Mitigate the Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District.

Null Hypothesis: Measures Taken to Mitigate the Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Farmers in Adamawa Northern Senatorial District are not significant	Chi-square Statistics	Degree of freedom (DF)	Significance (P-values)
Deployment of security personnel to the affected area by the government significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	178.726	4	0.000
There was significant efforts and achievements made in rescuing Kidnapped farmers which significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	625.873	4	0.000
Establishment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camps was a good measure taken to mitigate the impact of Boko Haram on the victims which significantly minimised the impact of the crisis.	514.863	4	0.000
Distribution of food items to victims significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	143.723	4	0.000
There was provision of free access to health facilities to victims of Boko Haram crisis which significantly reduced the impact of the crisis.	152.632	4	0.000
There was provision of free drinking water to victims of Boko Haram crisis which significantly reduced the impact of the crisis.	236.562	4	0.000
There was provision of free improved seeds to armers which significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	346.821	4	0.000
There was provision of free fertilizer to farmers which significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	526.728	4	0.000
There was provision of free pesticides to farmers which significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	141.622	4	0.000
There was provision of free tractor services to farmers which significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	511.623	4	0.000
Schools destroyed were re-established which significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	125.236	4	0.000
There was provision of free food items by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) which significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	619.672	4	0.000
There was provision of free drinking water by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) which significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	235.268	4	0.000

There was provision of free healthcare facilities by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) which significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	318.671	4	0.000
There was provision of free learning materials by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) which significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	367.562	4	0.000
There was provision of free clothing by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) which significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	321.651	4	0.000
There was provision of free improved maize seeds by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) which significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	231.451	4	0.000
There was provision of credit support by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) which significantly minimised the impact of Boko Haram crisis.	128.432	4	0.000

Source: Field Survey, 2024. Note that this table provides a summary of the chi-square test result

The significance of the measures taken to mitigate the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District is underscored by the results of the Chi-square test, which demonstrate the effectiveness of these interventions. The deployment of security personnel to affected areas by the government, as indicated by a Chi-square value of 178.726 and a significant p-value of 0.000, signifies the substantial impact of enhanced security measures in reducing the vulnerability of farmers to attacks and violence. Similarly, the rescue of kidnapped farmers, evidenced by a Chi-square value of 625.873 and a p-value of 0.000, highlights the success of efforts aimed at safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of farming communities.

The establishment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps emerges as a critical intervention, supported by a Chi-square value of 514.863 and a significant p-value of 0.000, indicating its effectiveness in providing refuge and essential services to displaced farmers. Likewise, the distribution of food items, with a Chi-square value of 143.723 and a p-value of 0.000, demonstrates its pivotal role in addressing food insecurity and ensuring access to nutritious meals for affected populations. Furthermore, the provision of free access to health facilities and drinking water, reflected by Chi-square values of 152.632 and 236.562 respectively, with significant p-values, underscores the importance of addressing basic needs and promoting the well-being of farming communities.

In addition, the provision of free agricultural inputs, including seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, and tractor services, is supported by Chi-square values ranging from 141.622 to 526.728, all with significant p-values, indicating their effectiveness in restoring agricultural productivity and livelihoods. The re-establishment of destroyed schools and the provision of free learning materials, with Chi-square values of 125.236 and 367.562 respectively, further demonstrate the positive impact of educational interventions on the future prospects of affected communities.

The contributions of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are evident in the provision of various forms of support, including food items, drinking water, healthcare facilities, learning materials, clothing, improved maize seeds, and credit assistance, all with significant Chi-square values and p-values of 0.000. These interventions reflect the collaborative efforts of NGOs, government agencies, and local communities in addressing the diverse needs of farmers and promoting resilience in conflict-affected areas.

Overall, the Chi-square test results affirm the significance of the measures taken to mitigate the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District. By demonstrating the effectiveness of these interventions in addressing immediate needs, restoring livelihoods, and promoting resilience, the findings underscore the importance of continued support and collaboration to sustainably address the complex challenges posed by the conflict.

3.2 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The Chi-square test results indicate the significant impact of various challenges facing farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District due to the Boko Haram insurgency. Each challenge analyzed exhibits a statistically significant association with the insurgency, as indicated by the low p-values (all equal to 0.000). Firstly, the high cost of transportation emerges as a substantial barrier. This challenge underscores the economic strain imposed on farmers by increased transportation expenses, likely due to disrupted supply chains and heightened security measures. Similarly, poor road networks exacerbate farmers' difficulties in accessing markets and essential services. The insurgency's impact on road infrastructure maintenance and construction further compounds these challenges, isolating rural communities and hindering economic opportunities.

Inadequate storage facilities pose significant risks to farmers, leading to post-harvest losses and reduced market access. The destruction of storage facilities by the insurgency exacerbates these challenges, contributing to food insecurity and economic instability. Additionally, challenges such as poor access to markets, the banning of urea fertilizer, and lack of government agricultural intervention highlight systemic issues that impede agricultural productivity and livelihoods in the region. Furthermore, the kidnapping and killing of farmers, destruction of farms, stealing of maize, and harassment by security personnel underscore the direct threats to farmers' safety and well-being posed by the insurgency. Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive strategies that prioritize infrastructure development, access to inputs, market facilitation, and security measures tailored to the needs of farmers in conflict-affected areas. Such interventions are crucial for promoting agricultural resilience, economic stability, and food security in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District amidst the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency.

The socio-economic impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers has been devastating, encompassing various dimensions of livelihoods and economic activities. The constant threat of violence, attacks on communities, and destruction of farmlands and infrastructure have disrupted agricultural production, leading to food insecurity, loss of income, and displacement of rural populations. Farmers face heightened risks and challenges, including reduced access to markets, increased costs of inputs, and limited opportunities for agricultural development. The insurgency has deepened poverty and economic

vulnerability among farming households, exacerbating social inequalities and hindering the region's overall economic progress.

The Chi-square test results examining the socioeconomic impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District reveal profound and statistically significant consequences across various dimensions. Firstly, the insurgency has drastically escalated the cost of living for farmers. This increased financial burden exacerbates existing economic challenges, pushing farmers further into poverty. Moreover, the insurgency has inflicted substantial financial losses on farmers, leading to greater income insecurity and vulnerability. Farmers, already grappling with limited resources, face heightened economic precarity due to the disruption of markets, increased costs of inputs, and loss of productive assets. As a result, households experience heightened economic strain, with implications for food security, education, and healthcare access.

Additionally, the destruction of farmers' means of livelihood and the hindrance to agricultural productivity underscore the severe disruptions inflicted by the insurgency on agricultural activities. The destruction of farmlands, farm equipment, and irrigation systems not only diminishes farmers' capacity to produce but also undermines long-term agricultural sustainability and resilience. This degradation of productive assets prolongs the recovery process, exacerbating farmers' economic hardship and impeding the region's agricultural development. Consequently, farmers have been compelled to endure significant financial setbacks, with many forced to relocate their farms and resort to borrowing money to cope with the economic fallout. Displacement disrupts established farming practices, disrupts social networks, and increases reliance on external assistance. Borrowing money to cover immediate needs further exacerbates farmers' indebtedness, perpetuating cycles of poverty and economic dependency.

Furthermore, the insurgency's adverse effects extend beyond individual farmers to hinder the overall development of agriculture in the region. The destabilization of agricultural systems, disruption of supply chains, and erosion of investor confidence impede efforts to modernize and diversify the agricultural sector. This stagnation undermines broader socioeconomic development initiatives, perpetuating poverty and hindering progress towards achieving food security and economic resilience in the region. In response to these challenges, concerted efforts are needed to address the root causes of conflict, restore peace and stability, and rebuild the agricultural sector. This entails implementing targeted interventions to support farmers, including access to financial assistance, rehabilitation of infrastructure, and provision of technical support and training. Additionally, initiatives to enhance market access, promote value chain development, and strengthen resilience to future shocks are essential for revitalizing the agricultural economy and fostering sustainable livelihoods in conflict-affected areas. Overall, the Chi-square test results provide compelling evidence of the profound socioeconomic impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District. By understanding the multifaceted nature of these challenges, policymakers and stakeholders can develop context-specific interventions that address the immediate needs of farmers while laying the groundwork for long-term recovery and resilience building in the region.

The psychological impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District is profound and pervasive, affecting their mental well-being in numerous ways. Firstly, the constant threat of violence and insecurity instills high levels of psychological distress among farmers, manifesting in anxiety, fear, and apprehension about their safety and that of their families. This heightened state of alertness and vigilance undermines farmers' ability to concentrate on farming tasks, as they remain preoccupied with concerns about potential attacks and the safety of their livelihoods. Moreover, the insurgency has contributed to a range of mental health symptoms among farmers, including depression, sleep disturbances, stress, and feelings of overwhelm. These symptoms reflect the cumulative impact of trauma, loss, and uncertainty experienced by farmers living in conflict-affected areas. The psychological toll of the insurgency extends beyond individual symptoms to encompass broader existential concerns, such as a loss of hope for the future. Farmers grapple with profound feelings of despair and disillusionment as they confront the protracted nature of the conflict, economic hardship, and the erosion of livelihoods. This loss of hope not only undermines farmers' resilience in the face of adversity but also exacerbates feelings of helplessness and powerlessness. Additionally, the psychological impact of the insurgency reverberates through social networks and community dynamics, affecting interpersonal relationships, trust, and social cohesion among farmers.

The Chi-square test results examining the psychological impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District unveil significant and distressing consequences on their mental well-being. Firstly, the insurgency has brought about high levels of psychological distress among farmers. This distress likely stems from the constant threat of violence, uncertainty about the future, and the traumatic experiences endured by farmers and their families. Additionally, farmers experience heightened anxiety regarding their safety and that of their loved ones. The pervasive fear and apprehension while working in the fields further exacerbate the psychological burden, impeding their ability to carry out farming tasks effectively and efficiently.

Furthermore, the insurgency has resulted in a range of mental health symptoms among farmers, including depression, nightmares, trouble sleeping, stress, and feelings of overwhelm. Farmers grapple with symptoms of depression as they navigate the daily challenges and uncertainties wrought by the insurgency, while nightmares and sleep disturbances reflect the pervasive impact of trauma on their mental health. Moreover, the persistent stress and feelings of overwhelm when contemplating the insurgency's consequences signify the chronic distress experienced by farmers, highlighting the urgency of addressing their psychological needs.

Additionally, the insurgency has led to a loss of hope for the future among farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District. The erosion of hope reflects the pervasive despair and disillusionment stemming from the protracted conflict, economic hardship, and loss of livelihoods. This loss of optimism further compounds the psychological distress experienced by farmers, exacerbating feelings of helplessness and despair. Consequently, addressing the psychological impact of the insurgency on farmers is paramount for promoting their mental well-being, resilience, and recovery from the trauma endured.

In response to these findings, tailored interventions are needed to support the mental health needs of farmers in conflict-affected areas. Psychosocial support programs, including counseling, trauma-informed care, and community-based support groups, can provide a safe space for farmers to process their experiences, build coping strategies, and foster social connections. Additionally, raising awareness about mental health issues and reducing stigma surrounding help-seeking behaviors are essential for ensuring farmers access the support they need. Collaborative efforts between government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and mental health professionals are crucial for delivering effective and sustainable mental health interventions that address the unique challenges faced by farmers in the aftermath of the Boko Haram insurgency.

3.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings, several key recommendations are proposed to mitigate the adverse impacts of the Boko Haram insurgency on farmers in the Adamawa Northern Senatorial District:

1. **Enhanced Security Measures:** Strengthen security efforts to protect farmers from kidnappings, killings, and farm destructions. This includes increasing military and police presence in rural areas and establishing rapid response units to address security threats swiftly.
2. **Infrastructure Development:** Prioritize the repair and maintenance of roads and transportation networks to facilitate better market access and reduce transportation costs. Additionally, invest in the construction and improvement of storage facilities to minimize post-harvest losses.
3. **Economic Support Programs:** Implement financial support initiatives, such as low-interest loans and grants, to help farmers recover from economic losses and rebuild their livelihoods. Additionally, provide subsidies for essential farming inputs like seeds, fertilizers, and equipment.
4. **Psychosocial Support Services:** Establish mental health programs to address the psychological distress among farmers. These services should include counseling, support groups, and community-based mental health initiatives to help farmers cope with anxiety, depression, and trauma.

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